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Judgments (Constitution)

(1) Babubhai; (2) State of Gujarat and others vs (1) State of Gujarat and others; (2) Ganeshbhai Jakshibhai Bharwad and others  [SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 26 Aug 2010]
(A) Criminal - Indian Penal Code, 1860, ss. 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 332, 333, 436 and 427 - Bombay Police Act, 1951, s. 135 - Prevention of Damages of Public Property Act, 1984, ss. 3 and 7 - Altercation took place between members of the two communities over the plying of rickshaws - In the incident, more than 20 persons were injured and three houses were set on fire and several police personnel were also injured - FIR was registered u/ss. 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 332, 333, 436 and 427 of the IPC r/w s. 135 of the Act, 1951 and ss. 3, 7 of Act, 1984 - No name were given in FIR - Another FIR was registered on the same date wherein it was alleged that an incident took place on the same day in which 18 persons were named as accused - Accused in both the cases filed special criminal application praying for investigation by an independent agency and another application for quashing criminal cases - Twenty two persons were arrested - On completion of investigation, the charge sheet was filed on 10.10.2008 against 12 accused persons and the case was committed to Sessions Court - HC quashed the second FIR and clubbed the investigation of the said FIR along with the investigation of the other FIR and investigation was transferred to the State CID Crime Branch - Hence, present appeals - (A) Two FIRs - Whether FIRs could be clubbed? - Held, in a case where more than one piece of information be given to the Police Officer In-charge in respect of the same incident involving one or more than one cognizable offences, Court has to examine the facts and circumstances giving rise to both the FIRs and the test of sameness is to be applied to find out whether both the FIRs relate to the same incident in respect of the same occurrence or are in regard to the incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction - If the answer is affirmative, the second FIR is liable to be quashed - However, in case, the contrary is proved, where the version in the second FIR is different and they are in respect of the two different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is permissible - In the present case, both the FIRs pertain to the two crimes committed in the same transaction - Scene of offence panchnamas establish clearly that the incidents in both the cases could not be distinct and independent of each other - HC reached the correct conclusion and second FIR was liable to be quashed - (B) Tainted Investigation - Held, in exceptional circumstances, the court in order to prevent the miscarriage of criminal justice, if it considers necessary, may direct for investigation de novo wherein the case presents exceptional circumstances - In such a situation, it may be in the interest of justice that independent agency chosen by the HC makes a fresh investigation - In the present case, HC has given detailed reasons for coming to the conclusion that the investigation was totally one-sided, biased and mala fide - One party was favoured by the investigating agency - Charge sheets filed by the investigating agency in both the cases were against the same set of accused - Thus, the order of the HC requires modification to the extent that the charge sheets in both the cases and any order consequent thereto stand quashed - Appeals disposed of.

(B) Criminal - Constitution - Constitution of India, 1950, arts. 20 and 21 - Investigation into a criminal offence - Held, investigation into a criminal offence must be free from objectionable features or infirmities which may legitimately lead to a grievance on the part of the accused that investigation was unfair and carried out with an ulterior motive - Not only the fair trial but fair investigation is also part of constitutional rights guaranteed u/arts. 20 and 21 of the Constitution - Therefore, investigation must be fair, transparent and judicious as it is the minimum requirement of rule of law - Investigating agency cannot be permitted to conduct an investigation in tainted and biased manner - Appeals disposed of.


Biman Basu vs Kallol Guha Thakurta and another  [SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 25 Aug 2010]
Constitution - Advocates & Judges - Practice & Procedure - Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, ss. 2(c), 15 and 19(1) - Some of the Judges of the Calcutta HC while on their way to the HC were 'detained' by a police officer so as to allow a procession of adivasis - Judge initiated contempt petition suo-motu - Appellant criticized said order and also made certain adverse comments against the Judge who passed the said order - Respondents moved a contempt petition in the HC with a prayer to initiate appropriate contempt proceedings against the appellant for making deliberate and willful derogatory, defamatory statements against Justice - Appellant raised the issue of maintainability of the contempt petition since the motion was moved without the consent in writing of Advocate General - HC held that appellant have committed criminal contempt and sentences to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 3 days and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- - Hence, present appeal - (A) Whether HC can entertain a contempt petition filed by a private person without the consent in writing of the Advocate General? - Held, in contempt petition there was no prayer for taking suo motu action against the appellants - The proceedings before the HC were initiated by the respondents by filing contempt petition u/s. 15 of the Act - The petition was vigorously pursued and argued as private petition - From the material available on record including the impugned judgment, it is impossible to accept the view taken by the HC that the Court had taken suo motu action - Even in SC, the respondents entered their appearance through their counsel who did not turn up but elaborate written submissions were submitted by the first respondent - Hence, petition to take action against the appellant u/s. 15 without the written consent of the Advocate General was not maintainable in law - Appeal allowed.
(1) State of Orissa; (2) Union of India vs Choudhuri Nayak (dead by LR) and others  [SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 20 Aug 2010]
Constitution - Freedom Fighters Pension Scheme, 1972 - Defence of India Rules, r. 38(5) - First respondent filed an application on 18.9.1978 claiming pension under the Freedom Fighters Pension Scheme, 1972 (scheme) claiming that he was convicted by the Sub-Divisional Officer u/r. 38(5) of the Defence of India Rules and sentenced to seven months' simple imprisonment - A public interest litigation was filed before HC alleging that the first respondent was drawing freedom fighter's pension by producing false and fabricated documents - State Government and Central Government issued a show cause notice to the first respondent - After considering the reply filed by first respondent, Central Government cancelled the freedom fighters pension granted to first respondent - Writ petition filed thereagainst was allowed - Hence, present appeal - Held, unsigned typed copy of jail certificate and the particulars given by the first respondent in his application were proved to be false - Further, it was proved that the first respondent made a deliberate false claim about his age to secure the pension - Hence, it was proved that the claim of the first respondent was based on false and fabricated documents - Therefore, the cancellation of the pension was justified and cannot be found fault with - Order of Central Government cancelling the pension affirmed - Appeal allowed.
State of Madhya Pradesh vs Pramod Kumar Shukla and another  [SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 18 Aug 2010]
Constitution - Service - A compounder in an autonomous government Ayurved college filed a writ petition before HC complaining about cancellation of his transfer order - HC dismissed the writ petition/appeal but made certain blanket prohibitory directions against the State Government - Hence, present appeal - Held, Court unable to appreciate the general and blanket prohibitory directions issued to the government - DB of the HC had before it the case of an individual employee and the adjudication should have concluded with the decision on the merits of his claim - In the facts and circumstances of the case, there was no occasion or justification for the general directions - Impugned directions set aside - Appeal allowed.
Common Cause (A Regd. Society) vs Union of India and another  [SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 18 Aug 2010]
Banking & Finance - Constitution - Constitution of India, art. 32 - Non Performing Assets (NPAs) of nationalised Banks - Failure to recover bad debts - Public Interest Litigation - Petitioner, a Society engaged in taking up various common problems of the people for redressal, alleged that non-recovery of huge amount of NPAs had resulted in substantial funds of banks not being available for development of the country's economy and that, in turn, had affected the citizens - Petitioner contended that the steps taken by the 1st respondent/Union Government to recover the NPAs had not yielded positive results and the Finance Ministry was reported to have admitted that 27 nationalised banks had written off a staggering amount of crores of rupees as bad debts - Held, petitioner did not make out a case that for enforcement of any right guaranteed under Part-III of the Constitution, writs or directions were required to be issued by SC u/art. 32 of the Constitution - Union Government had already taken some administrative measures such as setting up of 'Serious Fraud Investigation Office' (SFIO) and legislative measures such as the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, the Credit Information Companies (Regulation) Act, 2005 etc. - Respondents affirmed in its affidavit that they would try to reduce the number and amount of NPAs and to detect and check bank frauds in future - Further, whether legislative and administrative measures taken by the 1st respondent are effective or not, is not for the Court but for the 1st respondent and Parliament to consider because reduction and control of NPAs are not within the domain of judiciary but within the domain of the Executive and Legislature under the Constitution of India - Union Government, however, must ensure that SFIO is effective in detecting and preventing bank frauds by influential people - Further, Central Government has constituted a Committee of Experts and such Committee will consider the suggestion to make the SFIO (or any similar body) a statutory authority having sufficient powers and having the required autonomy to be able to effectively deal with the problems of bank frauds and NPAs - Petition disposed of.
State of West Bengal vs Subhas Kumar Chatterjee and others  [SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 17 Aug 2010]
Labour & Industrial Law - Constitution - Revision of Pay and Allowances Rules, 1998 - Constitution of India, 1950, art. 323-A - Pay scale - Respondents (Research Assistants) approached the Tribunal claiming revision of scale of pay and fixation of benefits w.e.f 1st April, 1981 in scale no. 14 - Tribunal disposed of the matter directing the Chief Engineer to dispose of the same by a reasoned order - Chief Engineer extended the scale no. 11 to the respondents which was not acceptable to the State Government - On appeal, HC dismissed petition filed against said order - Hence, present appeal - (A) Whether the Administrative Tribunal can delegate its power of judicial review and confer the same upon a Chief Engineer? - Held, Tribunals cannot go beyond the power conferred on them and delegate their essential function and duty to decide service related disputes - Such delegation is ab initio void - Power conferred upon the Administrative Tribunals under the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 flows from art. 323-A of the Constitution - Such power can never be delegated except under a valid law made by Parliament - (B) Whether the decision of Chief Engineer operates as res- judicata? - Held, HC committed an error in construing the orders passed by the Chief Engineer as a decision - There was no adjudication as such of any lis between the parties by the Chief Engineer - The Chief Engineer in law was not entitled to decide any dispute and much less with regard to any dispute and complaint with respect to conditions of service of any persons appointed to public posts controlled by the State Government - Administrative decisions by the executive authorities do not bind the courts and much less operate as res judciata - Hence, view taken by the Chief Engineer that the respondents were entitled to scale No.11, cannot operate as res judicata - (C) Whether a writ of mandamus lies compelling the State to act contrary to law? - Held, the Government cannot act contrary to the rules nor the Court can direct the Government to act contrary to rules - No court can issue Mandamus directing the authorities to act in contravention of the rules as it would amount to compelling the authorities to violate law - Such directions may result in destruction of rule of law - In the present case, the impugned order of the HC virtually compelled the State to give pay scales contrary to statutory rules under which pay scales of the employees are fixed - The decision of the Chief Engineer being contrary to Revision of Pay and Allowances Rules, 1998, cannot be enforced even if such a decision was taken under the directions of the Administrative Tribunal - The orders of the Tribunal as well as of the HC are liable to be set aside - Appeal allowed.
Indirect Tax Practitioners Association vs R. K. Jain  [SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 13 Aug 2010]
Constitution - Advocates & Judges - Practice & Procedure - Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, s. 2(c) - Constitution of India, 1950, arts. 129 and 142 - Criminal contempt - SC after taking cognizance of letter written by President of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal to the Chief Justice of India pointing out that the respondent had published objectionable editorials in Excise Law Times exaggerated versions of alleged deficiencies and irregularities in the functioning of the Tribunal, initiated contempt proceedings against respondent - Respondent filed undertaking, which was accepted by SC and contempt notice was discharged - During pendency of contempt case, the respondent had written detailed letters highlighting specific cases of irregularities, malfunctioning and corruption in the Central Excise, Customs and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) - Since no one seems to have taken cognizance of the letters written by the respondent, he wrote the editorial regarding the same - Present petition filed by Indirect Tax Practitioners' Association u/arts. 129 and 142 of the Constitution - (A) Whether by writing the editorial in question, respondent committed breach of the undertaking filed in Contempt Petition? - Held, respondent cannot be charged with the allegation of having violated the undertaking filed in SC - Respondent was very much conscious of the undertaking filed in the earlier contempt proceedings and this was the reason why before writing the editorial, he sent several communications to the concerned functionaries to bring to their notice serious irregularities in the transfer and posting of members, appointment of members, changes made in the pronounced orders and many unusual orders passed by the particular Bench of CESTAT, which were set aside by the Karnataka and the Kerala HCs after being subjected to severe criticism - Sole purpose of writing those letters was to enable the concerned authorities to take corrective measures but nothing appears to have been done by them to stem the rot - Respondent cannot be held guilty of violating the undertaking given to SC - (B) Whether contents of the editorial constitute criminal contempt within the meaning of s. 2(c) of the Act? - Held, nothing in the editorial which can be described as an attempt to lower the authority of CESTAT - Rather the object of the editorial was to highlight the irregularities in the appointment, posting and transfer of the members of CESTAT and instances of the abuse of the quasi judicial powers - What was incorporated in the editorial was nothing except the facts relating to manipulative transfer and posting of some members of CESTAT and substance of the orders passed by the particular Bench of CESTAT, which were set aside by the High Courts of Karnataka and Kerala - What the respondent projected was nothing but true state of the functioning of CESTAT on the administrative side and to some extent on the judicial side - By doing so, he had merely discharged the constitutional duty of a citizen enshrined in Article 51A(h) - Therefore, it cannot be said that by writing the editorial in question, the respondent tried to scandalize the functioning of CESTAT or made an attempt to interfere with the administration of justice - Further, truth should ordinarily be allowed as a defence unless the Court finds that it is only a camouflage to escape the consequences of deliberate or malicious attempt to scandalize the court or is an interference with the administration of justice - Since, the petitioner has not even suggested that what has been mentioned in the editorial is incorrect or that the respondent has presented a distorted version of the facts, there is no warrant for discarding the respondent's assertion that whatever he has written is based on true facts and the sole object of writing the editorial was to enable the concerned authorities to take corrective/remedial measures - Petition dismissed.
Tata Memorial Hospital Workers Union vs Tata Memorial Centre and another  [SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 09 Aug 2010]
Labour & Industrial Law - Constitution - Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act 1971, s. 2(3) - Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, s. 2(a) - Respondent No. 2 filed two applications sought cancellation of the recognition of the appellant union u/s. 13 of the MRTU and PULP Act as the recognized union under respondent No. 1 and application for substitution of second respondent in place of the appellant, as the recognized union - Industrial court held that 'appropriate government' for the first respondent was the State Government' - On appeal, Single Judge held that the first respondent is an autonomous body and though the Central Government was funding the first respondent partially, it had only a partial control thereof - Single Judge accepted the findings of the Industrial Court on the issue of appropriate government to be just, legal and proper and, therefore, dismissed the Writ Petition - DB held that the Central Government was the appropriate government for the first respondent and allowed the appeal - Consequently, it set aside the orders passed by the Single Judge as well as by the Industrial Court - Hence, present appeal - Whether the first respondent functions under the authority of the Central Government as its delegate as held by the Division Bench or is functioning as an independent entity? - Held, property dedicated to the first respondent has not been transferred to the Society by the Central Government - But the fact is that it is the Governing Council of the first respondent which has been administering and controlling the day to day affairs of respondent no. 1 and its property funds, employment of its staff and their conditions of service - Hence, property dedicated to the first respondent will be deemed to be vested in the Governing Council of the first respondent - Moreover, evidence of the Chief Administrative Officer of respondent no. 1 establishes that there was no interference of the Central Government in the day to day activities of the first respondent - The decisions were taken by the directors of the first respondent itself - Hence, State Government shall have to be held as the appropriate government for the respondent no. 1 for the purpose of Industrial Dispute Act - Impugned order of DB set aside and order of the Industrial Court and Single Judge restored - Appeal allowed.
Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu vs Union of India  [SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 09 Aug 2010]
Constitution - Civil Procedure - Constitution of India, 1950, art. 32 - Whether provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999 and Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002 are constitutional - Held, yes - Further, question of Judicial Impact Assessment was covered by way of general direction given by SC in its earlier orders - Petition disposed of.
Bhabani Prasad Jena vs Convenor Secretary, Orissa State Commission for Women and another  [SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 03 Aug 2010]
Family & Personal - Women & Children - Constitution - Orissa (State) Commission for Women Act, 1993, ss. 10(1)(d) and 10(3) - Special Marriage Act, 1954, ss. 13 and 25(iii) - Evidence Act, 1872, s. 112 - Extent of power of State Commission for Women - Direction for conducting DNA test - Appellant filed a petition u/s. 25(iii) of the Act, 1954 for a declaration that the marriage between him and the respondent no. 2 was nullity and the said marriage has not been consummated - Thereafter, respondent no. 2 filed a complaint before Orissa (State) Commission for Women (State Commission) alleging harassment meted out to her by the appellant and his family members - State Commission directed appellant to pay maintenance to respondent no. 2 and a direction was also issued for conducting deoxyribonucleic acid test (DNA) test of respondent no. 2 - On appeal, HC upheld the said order accordingly and the appellant was also directed to give his blood sample for the purpose of DNA - Hence, present appeal - (A) Extent of power of State Commission for Women - Held, no power or authority has been given to the State Commission to adjudicate or determine the rights of the parties - Provision contained in s. 10(1)(d) is expressly clear that the State Commission may receive complaints in relation to the matters specified therein and on receipt of such complaints take up the matter with the authorities concerned for appropriate remedial measures - The 1993 Act has not entrusted the State Commission with the power to take up the role of a court or an adjudicatory tribunal and determine the rights of the parties - State Commission is not a tribunal discharging the functions of a judicial character or a court - Further, expression, 'have all the powers of a Civil Court' in s. 10(3) is qualified by the following words, 'in respect of the following matters' - That is to say, the State Commission has powers of Civil Court trying a suit for the matters specified in clauses (a) to (f) of s. s. 10(3) thereof and not for other purposes - Hence, order passed in the present case was outside the jurisdiction, power or competence of the State Commission - (B) Whether the HC was justified in issuing direction for DNA of the child? - Held, DNA in a matter relating to paternity of a child can be given by a court only if a strong prima facie case is made out for such a course - In the present case, HC exceeded its jurisdiction in passing the impugned order - HC over-looked a very material aspect that the matrimonial dispute between the parties is already pending in the court of competent jurisdiction and all aspects concerning matrimonial dispute raised by the parties in that case shall be adjudicated and determined by that Court - Order of the HC and State Commission set aside - Appeals allowed.
Zonal Manager, Central Bank of India vs Devi Ispat Limited and others  [SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 30 Jul 2010]
Constitution - Banking & Finance - Contract & Commercial - Constitution of India, 1950, arts. 12 and 226 - Maintainability of writ petition - Respondent-Company was banking with the appellant-Bank - Due to various irregularities in the account of the respondent-Company, the appellant-Bank advised the respondent-Company to shift its loan account to some other Bank - Respondent-Company requested appellant-Bank to handover the original title deeds of its factory premises and all the collateral securities held by it as against the respondent-Company to another Nationalized Bank to whom they had transferred their account - As per contract settlement, the Nationalized Bank issued a Banker's cheque of Rs. 15 crores to the respondent-Company which the appellant-Bank had encashed and appropriated in lieu of the outstanding balances lying against the respondent-Company - Thereafter, respondent-Company requested appellant-Bank to return Security documents - Respondent-Company filed writ petition which was allowed and appellant-Bank was directed to release the security documents - Appeal filed thereagainst was dismissed - Hence, present appeal - It was submitted that the direction of the Single Judge affirmed by the DB for return of the title deeds deposited by the respondent-Company as a security cannot be a subject-matter of art. 226 of the Constitution - Held, (a) in the contract if there is a clause for arbitration, normally, writ court should not invoke its jurisdiction; (b) the existence of effective alternative remedy provided in the contract itself is a good ground to decline to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction u/art. 226; and (c) if the instrumentality of the State acts contrary to the public good, public interest, unfairly, unjustly, unreasonably discriminatory and violative of art. 14 of the Constitution in its contractual or statutory obligation, writ petition would be maintainable - However, a legal right must exist and corresponding legal duty on the part of the State and if any action on the part of the State is wholly unfair or arbitrary, writ courts can exercise their power - In present case, appellant-Bank, being a public sector Bank, discharging public functions is "State" u/art. 12 - In view of the settlement of the dues on the date of filing of the writ petition by arrangement made through another Nationalized Bank and the statement of accounts furnished by the appellant-Bank subsequent to the same is nil outstanding, HC was fully justified in issuing a writ of mandamus for return of its title deeds - Appeal dismissed.
Moumita Poddar vs Indian Oil Corporation Limited and another  [SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 30 Jul 2010]
Constitution - Administrative - Constitution of India, 1950, art. 136 - Transfer of Property Act, 1882, s. 107 - Notaries Act, 1952 - Appointment of Retail Outlet Dealership - Respondent No.1, published a notice for appointment of Retail Outlet Dealership - Appellant and respondent No.2 submitted application for appointment of Retail Outlet Dealer in Open Category - Respondent No.2 indicated in application form that she had suitable site readily available for dealership and offered lease deed as proof of her "capability to provide land" for being used by respondent No.1 as a Retail Outlet Dealership - Thereafter, interviews were conducted by respondent No.1 for appointment of Retail Outlet Dealers - Nine persons, including appellant and respondent No.2, appeared before Interview Board - Interview board, upon evaluation of inter se merits of all nine applicants, in terms of policy circular, empanelled three candidates in order of merit - Respondent No.2 was placed at Sl.No.1 in order of merit - Appellant was not amongst first three candidates and was consequently not empanelled - Letter of Intent was issued in respondent no. 2 favour - Appellant filed writ petition challenging the same - Single Judge held that selection of respondent No.2 was contrary to applicable policy guidelines and entire selection process was vitiated on ground of non-application of mind and arbitrariness - Appeals filed thereagainst were allowed - DB concluded that even though tenancy agreement was not registered, it could still be a genuine document - It was held that non-registration of document as required u/s.107 of Transfer of Property Act would not affect genuineness of document which stands established by attestation of document by a notary public notified under Notaries Act, 1952 - Present appeal - Held, a clear procedure was laid down in circular for making selection - It was clearly provided that candidates will be evaluated by selection committee through interviews based on marking system - Three categories of candidates were stipulated, namely, i) owner of land who is willing to give land to respondent No.1 by sale/lease; ii) individuals who have firm offers from land owner who are willing to give land to respondent No.1; and iii) candidates who can arrange land - Both on date of application and date of interview, respondent No.2 did not fall within any of aforesaid categories - Therefore, her selection was vitiated, as Selection Committee deviated from criteria laid down in Circular - DB committed an error of law, in upholding selection of respondent No.2 - However, under Circular, upon selection and appointment of respondent No.2 being declared illegal, entire selection could not have been held to be vitiated - In such circumstances, Letter of Intent would be issued to next candidate in panel of three - In present case, such an eventuality would not have arisen, as candidates at Nos.2 and 3 have not challenged selection and grant of dealership to respondent No.2 - Therefore, Single Judge needlessly set aside entire selection - However, dealership has been operating for more than five years - Closure of dealership, at this juncture, would result in disastrous consequences to respondent No.2 - Therefore, keeping in view overall public interest, exercise extra ordinary jurisdiction of u/art. 136 of Constitution of India for setting aside selection made in favour of respondent No.2 declined - Appeals dismissed.
Musamiya Imam Haiderbux Rizvi vs State of Gujarat and another  [SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 27 Jul 2010]
Constitution - Whether inclusion of Gujarat Devasthan Inams Abolition Act, 1969 and Gujarat Devasthan Inams Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1977 in the Ninth Schedule by Constitution (Sixty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1990 is constitutionally valid - Held, yes - Relied on the decision of I.R. Coelho (Dead) by Lrs. vs. State of Tamil Nadu, 2007 INDLAW SC 12 - Appeal disposed of.
Shalini Shyam Shetty and another vs Rajendra Shankar Patil  [SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 23 Jul 2010]
Constitution - Land & Property - Constitution of India, 1950, arts. 226 and 227 - (A) HC's power of superintendence u/art. 227 - In a dispute between landlord and tenant - Held, a writ petition is a remedy in public law which may be filed by any person but the main respondent should be either Government, Governmental agencies or a State or instrumentalities of a State within the meaning of art. 12 - Private individuals cannot be equated with State or instrumentalities of the State - Further, all the respondents in a writ petition cannot be private parties; but private parties acting in collusion with State can be respondents in a writ petition - Principles on the exercise of HC jurisdiction u/art. 227 of the Constitution formulated - Further, in cases of property rights and in disputes between private individuals writ court should not interfere unless there is an infraction of a statute or it can be shown, that a private individual is acting in collusion with a statutory authority - HCs in exercise of power either u/art. 226 or 227 to follow the time honoured principles and will adhere to them strictly - (B) It was urged that petitions u/art. 227 of the Constitution are filed against orders of Civil Court and even in disputes between landlord and tenant and under the Bombay High Court Rules, such petitions are called writ petitions - Held, it does not appear from the said Rules that petitions u/art. 227 are called writ petitions - Further, power to issue writs underwent a sea-change with the coming in force of the Constitution - Now writs can be issued by HCs only u/art. 226 of the Constitution and by the SC only u/art. 32 of the Constitution - No writ petition can be moved u/art. 227 of the Constitution nor can a writ be issued u/art. 227 of the Constitution - Therefore, a petition filed u/art. 227 of the Constitution cannot be called a writ petition - Appeal dismissed.
Arun Kumar Agrawal and another vs National Insurance Company and others  [SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 22 Jul 2010]
(A) Carriers & Transportation - Constitution - Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, s. 166 - Criteria for determination of the compensation payable to the dependents of a woman who dies in a road accident and who does not have regular source of income - Held, in India the Courts have recognised that the contribution made by the wife to the house is invaluable and cannot be computed in terms of money - However, for the purpose of award of compensation to the dependents, some pecuniary estimate has to be made of the services of housewife/mother - In that context, the term 'services' is required to be given a broad meaning and must be construed by taking into account the loss of personal care and attention given by the deceased to her children as a mother and to her husband as a wife - However, it is highly unfair, unjust and inappropriate to compute the compensation payable to the dependents of a deceased wife/mother, who does not have regular income, by comparing her services with that of a housekeeper or a servant or an employee, who works for a fixed period - Further, in the absence of any other definite criteria for determination of compensation payable to the dependents of a non-earning housewife/mother, it would be reasonable to rely upon the criteria specified in clause (6) of the Second Schedule and then apply appropriate multiplier keeping in view the judgments of SC in General Manager Kerala State Road Transport Corporation v. Susamma Thomas (Mrs.) and others, 1993 INDLAW SC 1302, U.P.S.R.T.C. v. Trilok Chandra 1996 INDLAW SC 2879, Sarla Verma (Smt.) and others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another 2009 INDLAW SC 488 and also take guidance from the judgment in Lata Wadhwa's case 2001 INDLAW SC 20611 - Appeal allowed.

(B) Carriers & Transportation - Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, s. 166 - Determination of compensation payable - Deceased, wife of appellant no.1 and mother of appellant no. 2 died in a road accident - Appellants filed a petition u/s. 166 of the Act for award of compensation by asserting that the accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the truck which was owned by respondent no.2 and was insured with respondent no.1 - Tribunal held that in view of clause 6 of Second Schedule of the Act, the income of the deceased could be assessed at Rs.5,000 per month and after making deduction of Rs.20,000 towards personal expenses of the deceased and applying the multiplier of 15, the total loss of dependency comes to Rs.6 lacs - However, instead of awarding that amount as compensation, the Tribunal reduced the same to Rs.2,50,000 - Appeal filed thereagainst was dismissed - Hence, present appeal - Held, appellant no.1 stated that the deceased was earning Rs.50,000 per annum by paintings and handicrafts, the respondents did not lead any evidence to controvert the same - Notwithstanding this, the Tribunal and the HC altogether ignored the income of the deceased - Further, reasons assigned by the Tribunal for reducing the amount of compensation were wholly untenable and the approach adopted by the HC in dealing with the issue of payment of compensation to the appellants was ex facie erroneous and unjustified - Impugned judgment and award of the Tribunal set aside - Appellants entitled to compensation of Rs.6 lacs - Respondent no.1 directed to pay the said amount of compensation along with interest - Appeal allowed.

Obiter Dictum

Time has come for the Parliament to have a rethinking for properly assessing the value of homemakers and householders work and suitably amending the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act and other related laws for giving compensation when the victim is a woman and a homemaker. Amendments in matrimonial laws may also be made in order to give effect to the mandate of Article 15(1) in the Constitution.


Union of India and others vs Pritilata Nanda  [SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 16 Jul 2010]
Service - Constitution - Constitution of India, 1950, art. 16 - Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959 - Appointment - Respondent applied for appointment as Class III employee and appeared in the written test - She was selected - Notwithstanding this, she was not appointed - Respondent filed application before Central Administrative Tribunal - Appellants contended that the respondent was not offered appointment because her candidature had not been sponsored by any special employment exchange or any ordinary employment exchange - Application was dismissed by Tribunal - Appeal filed thereagainst was allowed by HC - HC directed the appellants to issue letter of appointment to respondent - Hence, present appeal - Whether respondent, who is physically handicapped, could be denied appointment on Class III post despite her selection by the competent authority only on the ground that she did not get her name sponsored by an employment exchange? - Held, requirement of notifying the vacancies to the employment exchange is embodied in the Act, but there is nothing in the Act which obligates the employer to appoint only those who are sponsored by the employment exchange - Hence, concerned authorities of the South Eastern Railway committed grave illegality by denying appointment to the respondent only on the ground that she did not get her name sponsored by an employment exchange - Further, by denying appointment to the respondent despite her selection and placement in the merit list, the appellants violated her right to equality in the matter of employment guaranteed u/art. 16 of the Constitution - However, while the HC was fully justified in directing the appellants to appoint the respondent from the date persons lower in merit were appointed, but it is not possible to confirm the direction given for payment of full salary with retrospective effect - Operative part of the impugned order modified accordingly - Appeal dismissed.
Amicus Curiae vs Prashant Bhushan and another  [SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 14 Jul 2010]
Constitution - Rules to Regulate Proceedings for Contempt of the Supreme Court, 1975, r. 3(c) - Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, s. 15 - Respondent no. 1 made certain statements in an interview given to Tehelka Magazine alleging corruption in the judiciary and, in particular, the higher judiciary, without any material in support thereof - Chief Justice of India directed issuance of notice to the respondents to show cause in regard to allegations - Respondent no. 1 filed appeal questioning the maintainability of the contempt proceedings and also questioning whether this Court should take suo motu cognizance and proceed accordingly - Held, there were sufficient grounds for taking action on its own motion, the Court initiated suo motu action by directing issue of notice to the Respondents - The present contempt proceeding was initiated by the Court on its own motion and it is not covered by clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of s. 15 of the Contempt of courts Act, 1971 or clauses (b) and (c) of r. 3 of the Rules to Regulate Proceedings for Contempt of the Supreme Court, 1975 - Merely because the information regarding the allegedly contemptuous statements made by Respondent No.1 and published by Respondent No.2 was furnished to the Court by the Amicus Curiae, the proceeding cannot lose its nature or character as a suo motu proceeding - Petition disposed of.
State of Maharashtra and others vs Sangharaj Damodar Rupawate and others  [SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 09 Jul 2010]
Constitution - Media & Entertainment - Indian Penal Code, 1860, ss. 153, 153-A and 34 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, s. 195 - Power to forfeit a newspaper, book or document - Validity of a notification issued u/s. 95 of the CrPC - Respondent no. 5, the publisher entered into an agreement with Oxford University Press, USA for publishing in India a paper-bound book authored by respondent no.4 - Respondent no.5 received a letter from historians whereby respondent nos. 4 and 5 were asked to retract the objectionable statement complained of and tender an apology - Instructions were issued to immediately withdraw all copies of the book from circulation - After withdrawal of the book from circulation, a mob blackened the face of a Sanskrit Scholar (whose name appeared in the acknowledgement of the book) and destroyed a large number of books and rare manuscripts - State of Maharashtra, registered a FIR against respondents no. 4 to 6 (the author, publisher and printer of the book) u/ss. 153, 153-A and 34 of the IPC - Thereafter, Government of Maharashtra issued a notification declaring that every copy of the book shall be forfeited to the Government - Said notification was challenged in the HC - However, during the pendency of the petition, this notification was withdrawn and another notification was issued under sub-s. (1) of s. 95 of the CrPC - Petition was amended and challenge to notification was laid mainly on the grounds that: (1) there was no material to show that the publication of the book had resulted in disturbance of public tranquillity or maintenance of harmony between various groups as set out therein, and (2) the publication does not disclose any offence u/s. 153-A of the IPC - HC quashed and set aside the notification - Present appeal - Held, power to issue a declaration of forfeiture under the provision postulates compliance with twin essential conditions, viz., (i) the Government must form the opinion to the effect that such newspaper, book or document contains any matter, the publication of which is punishable u/s. 124-A or s. 153-A or s. 153-B or s. 292 or s. 293 or s. 295-A of the IPC, and (ii) the Government must state the grounds for its opinion - It is mandatory that a declaration by the State Government in the form of notification, to the effect that every copy of the issue of the newspaper, book or document be forfeited to Government, must state the grounds on which the State Government has formed a particular opinion - In the present case, it cannot be found out from the notification as to which communities got outraged by the publication of the book or it had caused hatred and animosity between particular communities or groups - Nothing on record to show that the book was likely to promote disharmony or feeling of enmity between various groups or likely to cause disturbance to public tranquillity and maintenance of harmony between various groups - Thus, the conditions statutorily mandated for exercise of power u/s. 95 of the CrPC are lacking and therefore, the action of the Government cannot be sustained - Appeal dismissed.
(1) Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Limited and another; (2) Central Power Distribution Company of Andhra Pradesh and another; (3) Eastern Power Distribution Company of Andhra Pradesh Limited and another; (4) Southern Power Distribution Company of Andhra Pradesh Limited and another; (5) Northern Power Distribution Company of Andhra Pradesh and another; (6) Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission vs (1) Sai Renewable Power Private Limited and others; (2) M. S. Biomass Energy Developers Association and others; (3) Small Hydro Power Developers Association and others; (4) K. M. Power Private Limited and others; (5) Manihamsa Power Projects Limited and others; (6) PMC Power Private Limited and others; (7) Bhavani Hydro Power Projects Private Limited and others; (8) NCL Energy Limited and others; (9) Active Power Corporation Private Limited and others; (10) Kakatiya Cement Sugars and Industries Limited and others; (11) Kallam Spinning Mills Limited and others; (12) Fivess Power Projects Private Limited and others; (13) Srinivasa Power Projects Private Limited and others; (14) Janapadu Hydro Projects Private Limited and others; (15) South Indian Sugar Mills Association and others; (16) Vensa Bio-Tek Limited and others; (17) Sagar Sugars and Allied Products Limited and others; (18) Raus Power Limited and others; (19) Balaji Energy Private Limited and others; (20) Saraswati Power and Industries Private Limited and others; (21) Gayatri Sugars Limited and others; (22) Roshini Powertech Limited and others; (23) Gayatri Agro Industrial Power Limited and others; (24) Vamshi Industries Limited and others; (25) Matrix Power Private Limited and others; (26) Gowthami Bio-Energies Limited and others; (27) Biomas Energy Developers Association and others; (28) Small Hydro Developers Association and others; (29) Jeypore Sugar Company Limited and another; (30) GMR Industries Limited and another; (31) Kaktiya Alloys (P) Limited and others; (32) Chodavaram Coop Sugar Limited and others  [SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 08 Jul 2010]
(A) Electricity & Energy - Electricity Act, 2003, ss. 61, 62, 86, 111(1) - Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998, ss. 11, 26 - Development of non-conventional energy - Fixation of tariff - Jurisdiction of State Regulatory Commission - 6th appellant/Regulatory Commission fixed the energy purchased rates and restricted the sale, procurement and distribution of electricity by respondent/non-conventional energy developers - Respondent/Developers filed review petition before the 6th appellant - 6th appellant clarified the order to some extent, however, being dissatisfied with the clarification, respondents filed independent appeal u/s. 111(1) of the 2003 Act before the Appellate Tribunal - Appellate Tribunal held that there was some element of duress in execution of the Power Purchase Agreements (PPA) and since PPA was a statutory document, 6th appellant had no authority to interfere with the same - Appellate Tribunal, further, held that 6th appellant had neither the power nor the jurisdiction to compel the respondent/Developers to sell the power generated by them to the Government Companies - (a) Whether 6th appellant has the jurisdiction for fixation of tariff and sale of generated electricity to third party - Held, s. 11 of 1998 Act declares fixation of tariff as one of the primary functions of the 6th appellant in general more particularly, to the specified consumers u/s. 26 of the 1998 Act - Ss. 61 and 62 r/w s. 86 (1)(a)(b) of 2003 Act deal with fixation of tariffs in relation to production, distribution and sale of generated power to the end consumer and clearly demonstrate that the 6th appellant is vested with the function for determining the tariff for generation, supply, transmission and billing of electricity etc., as well as regulation of electricity purchase and procurement process of distribution licensees, including price at which electricity should be procured from the generating companies - With the said statutory powers of the 6th appellant, it cannot be said that procurement of power from the respondent/Developers would not fall within the ambit of powers and functions of the 6th appellant - Appellate Tribunal fell in error of law in coming to the conclusion that the 6th appellant had no powers either in law or otherwise of reviewing the tariff and so called incentives - Therefore, 6th appellant is vested with the power to revise tariff and conditions in relation to procurement of power from respondent/Developers - (b) Whether respondent/Developers entered into the PPAs due to duress by the State and hence, does the plea of duress need to be accepted as per settled principles and with reference to the facts of the case - Held, to frustrate a contract on the ground of duress or coercion, there has to be definite pleadings which have to be substantiated normally by leading cogent and proper evidence - However, in the present case, nothing was brought to the notice of the Court to state the plea of duress and to prove the alleged facts which constituted duress, so as to vitiate and/or even partially reduce, the effect of the PPAs - No documentary or other evidences were available on record to sustain the plea that the contracts (PPAs) were a result of undue influence or duress by the State or its agencies upon the respondent/Developers - Further, respondent/Developers have already taken benefit of that contract which was based on the policy of the State as well as the order of the 6th appellant - Having attained the benefits of the contracts, respondent/Developers cannot claim that those contracts were the result of duress - (c) What is the effect of Appellate Tribunal order having attained finality and even not being questioned in the present proceedings - Held, even in present proceedings there is no challenge to the Appellate Tribunal order which, admittedly, has been acted upon and has attained finality - Respondent/Developers have executed the PPAs without any protest and, in fact, did nothing to challenge such agreements or any part thereof, till passing of the impugned order - Although some Developers challenged the validity of Tribunal order before the HC, all such proceedings culminated into dismissal - Therefore, Appellate Tribunal order attained finality subject to the judgment of present proceedings - Appeal disposed of.

(B) Electricity & Energy - Constitution - Electricity Act, 2003, s. 82(1) - Constitution of India, 1950, art. 136 - Non-conventional energy - Determination of tariff - Interference by the SC - Whether determination of tariff by the Court is justifiable - Held, 6th appellant/Regulatory Commission constituted u/s. 82(1) of 2003 Act, being a specialized body, is expected to examine issues relating to the rate of tariff - SC in exercise of its powers u/art. 136 of the Constitution would not sit as an appellate authority over the formation of opinion and determination of tariff by the specialized bodies - Determination of tariff is a function assigned legislatively to a competent forum/authority - Whether it is by exercise of legislative or subordinate legislative power or a policy decision, if the Act so requires, but it generally falls in the domain of legislative activity and the Courts refrain from adverting into the said arena - Appeal disposed of.

(C) Contract & Commercial - Electricity & Energy - Development of non-conventional energy - Incentives by State and Central Governments - Alteration of incentives - Plea of promissory estoppel - Sustainability - Respondent/Developers claimed that the State Government and the Regulatory Commission both were bound to continue the incentives as were provided to them in furtherance to the letters and orders of Central as well as the State Governments and they had a legitimate right to expect that those incentives were to be continued indefinitely in the same manner and the authorities concerned were estopped from altering the rates and/or imposing the condition of no sale to third parties - Is the principle of estoppel attracted in the present case, if so, to what extent - Held, Tribunal erred in law in treating inter-se letters and guidelines between the Government of India, State Government and the 6th appellant/Commission/the State Electricity Board as unequivocal commitments to the respondent/purchasers/generators/developers so as to bind the State for all times to come - Policy guidelines issued by the Central Government were the proposals sent to the State Government, which the State Government accepted to consider, amend or alter as per their needs and conditions and then make efforts to achieve the objects of encouraging Non-conventional Energy Generator and Purchasers to enter into the field - No definite and clear promise was made by the authorities to the respondent/Developers that would invoke the principle of promissory estoppels - Further, the present matter which, primarily, falls in the realm of contract and the parties would be governed by the agreements that they have signed - Once those agreements are singed and are enforceable in law then the contractual obligations cannot be frustrated by the aid of promissory estoppels - Therefore, State or the Regulatory Commission or erstwhile State Electricity Board were not bound to allow same tariff and permit third party sales for an indefinite period to any extent - Respondents plea of promissory estoppel, hence, cannot be sustained - Appeal disposed of.


Sindhi Education Society and another vs Chief Secretary, Government of (NCT of Delhi) and others  [SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 08 Jul 2010]
Education - Constitution - Delhi School Education Rules 1973, r. 64(1)(b) - Delhi School Education Act, 1973 - Constitution of India, 1950, art. 30(1) - Constitutionality of Delhi School Education Act, 1973 - Appellant-Society was a linguistic minority institution and had been running as such for a considerable time - It received grant-in-aid for all this period - In the year 1973, the DSE Act came into force - After coming into force of the provisions of the DSE Act, 1973, Society challenged the Act on the ground that the Act infringed the minority character of the Society, particularly, in matters related to administration and management of the school - HC held that the Society was a linguistic minority and the provisions of the DSE Act as specified in the judgment would not be applicable to the Society - DB also held that r. 64 of the DSE Rules was to be construed in respect of minority schools to require compliance only if those provisions of the Act and the Rules and instructions thereunder were in consonance with the provisions of the Constitution, particularly, with art. 30(1) of the Constitution - Subsequently, instructions were issued by the Deputy Director of Education, to the appellant stating, inter alia, that in accordance with provision of r. 64 of the DSE Rules, the Managing Committee of the Society was required to furnish an undertaking that they would make reservation in the appointments of teachers for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes - Appellant again filed writ petition which was allowed by Single Judge relying on the DB judgement in Sumanjit Kaur v. NCT of Delhi [2005 III AD (Delhi) 560 - DB while setting aside the judgment of the Single Judge and also expressing a dissent to the DB judgement in Sumanjit Kaur case, DB recorded that r. 64(1)(b) does not infringe any right of the minority institution - Hence, present appeal - Whether r. 64(1)(b) of the DSE Rules, 1973 and the orders/instructions issued thereunder would, if made applicable to an aided minority educational institution, violate the fundamental right guaranteed u/art. 30(1) of the Constitution and were the respondents entitled to a declaration and consequential directions to that effect? - Held, scheme of the DSE Act, in particular, is to give greater freedom to the aided minority institutions and not to impinge upon their minority status as granted u/art. 30(1) of the Constitution - Article 30 gives certain rights to the minorities, i.e. all minorities whether religious or linguistic, have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice - It requires the State not to discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language, while granting aid to the educational institution - School run by linguistic minority would be entitled to receive grant-in-aid if it is imparting education in the language of the minority, of course, by satisfying other stated conditions - The right to receive grant thus has to be accepted as a legitimate right in contra-distinction or opposed to legal right to get recognition including the case of a minority institution - The logical impact of art. 30(2) read with the provisions of the DSE Act and the Rules framed thereunder is that, to receive grant-in-aid is a legitimate right of a school subject to satisfying the requirements of law - Article 30(2) thus, has been worded in a negative language not permitting the State to discriminate against the minority institution in relation to the matters of grant-in-aid - Right to establish and administer includes a right to appoint teachers - Except providing grant-in-aid as per the DSE Rules and having no power to discriminate in terms of art. 30(2) of the Constitution, the Government has a very limited regulatory control over the minority institutions and no control whatsoever on the managing committee, internal management of the school and, of course, has no power to take over such an institution - The right under clause (1) of art. 30 is not absolute but subject to reasonable restrictions which, inter alia, may be framed having regard to the public interest and national interest of the country - It is also well settled that a minority institution does not cease to be so, the moment grant-in-aid is received by the institution - An aided minority education institution, therefore, would be entitled to have the right of admission of students belonging to the minority group and, at the same time, would be required to admit a reasonable extent of non-minority students, to the extent, that the right in art. 30(1) is not substantially impaired and further, the citizen's right u/art. 29 (2) is not infringed - Hence, r. 64(1)(b) is not enforceable against the linguistic minority school in the NCT of Delhi - Appeal allowed.
Government of India, through Secretary and another vs Ravi Prakash Gupta and another  [SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 07 Jul 2010]
Service - Constitution - Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, s. 19 - Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection, Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, ss. 32 and 33 - Appointment of visually handicapped person to IAS - Respondent No.1, a visually handicapped candidate was placed at serial no.5 of the merit list prepared for visually handicapped candidates - Although there were more than 5 vacancies available in the visually handicapped category, only one post was offered under the said category and respondent no. 1 was, therefore, not given appointment despite the vacancies available - Respondent no. 1 filed an application u/s. 19 of Act, 1985 for appointment under the reservation of vacancies for disabled categories provided for u/s. 33 of the Act, 1995 contending that since the aforesaid Act came into force in 1996 providing a statutory mandate for reservation of 3% of the posts available for persons suffering from different kinds of disabilities reservation ought to have been in force w.e.f. the date on which the Act came into force - - Tribunal rejected contention - On appeal, HC accepted the contentions of the respondent no. 1 and set aside the order of Tribunal - Hence, present appeal - Petitioner submitted that Government of India had been making reservation for physically handicapped persons in Group 'C' and 'D' posts from 1977 and in order to consider the growing demand from the visually handicapped persons it constituted an Expert Committee to identify/review posts in categories 'A, 'B', 'C' and 'D', in which recommendations were made for identification of posts for the visually handicapped persons - Report of the expert committee regarding reservation for physically handicapped persons was accepted by the Ministry in 2001 and for the first time in 2005, the posts of the Indian Administrative Service were identified in compliance with the provisions of s. 33 of the Disabilities Act, 1995 and pursuant to such identification upto 3% of vacancies in the reserved posts were, accordingly, identified w.e.f. 2006 and the claim of the Respondent No.1 for appointment on the basis of the argument that the reservation should have taken effect from 1996 when the Act came into force, was liable to be rejected - Whether the reservation provided for in s. 33 of the Disabilities Act, 1995, was dependent on identification of posts suitable for appointment in such categories? - Held, submission made on behalf of the petitioner regarding the implementation of the provisions of s. 33 of the Disabilities Act, 1995, only after identification of posts suitable for such appointment, u/s. 32 thereof, runs counter to the legislative intent with which the Act was enacted - Such a stand taken by the petitioners before the HC was rightly rejected - Unless posts are identified for the purposes of s. 33 of the Disabilities Act, 1995, no appointments from the reserved categories can be made, and that to such extent the provisions of s. 33 are dependent on s. 32 of the Disabilities Act, 1995, but the extent of such dependence would be for the purpose of making appointments and not for the purpose of making reservation - Reservation u/s. 33 of the Act is not dependent on identification, though a duty has been cast upon the appropriate Government to make appointments in the number of posts reserved for the three categories mentioned in s. 33 of the Act in respect of persons suffering from the disabilities - No reason to interfere with the judgment of the HC - Petition dismissed.
Nagaland Senior Government Employees Welfare Association and others vs State of Nagaland and others  [SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 06 Jul 2010]
Service - Constitution - Nagaland Retirement from Public Employment Act, 1991, s. 3 - Nagaland Retirement from Public Employment (Second Amendment) Act, 2009 - Constitution of India, 1950, arts. 14, 16 and 21 - Challenge to the 2nd Amendment Act, 2009 - Bill titled ‘The Nagaland Retirement from Public Employment (Second Amendment) Bill, 2009' was introduced on the floor of the House vide which the length of service of the State Government employees was proposed to be restricted to 35 years from the date of joining of service or till he/she attains the age of 60 years, whichever is earlier - State Legislature of Nagaland unanimously passed the Amendment Bill - Appellant-Association filed writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of the 2nd Amendment Act, 2009 being arbitrary, irrational, ultra vires and violative of arts 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution - Association prayed that 2nd Amendment Act, 2009 be quashed to the extent it has introduced 35 years' service as one of the conditions for retirement of government employees and direction be issued to the State to superannuate its employees only on attaining the prescribed age of 60 - DB dismissed said writ petition - Hence, present appeal - Whether the impugned provision that prescribes retiring the persons from public employment in the State of Nagaland on completion of 35 years' service from the date of joining or until attaining the age of 60 years, whichever is earlier, is arbitrary, irrational and violative of arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution? - Held, s. 3 as substituted by 2nd Amendment Act, 2009 is designed to lay down a general framework of retirement policy - It seeks to put a cap on the number of years an employee may be allowed to be in the service of the State Government in order to make available job opportunities in a more equitable manner to its educated youth - Impugned provision is aimed to combat unrest amongst educated unemployed youth and to ensure that they do not join underground movement - Public employment opportunity is national wealth in which all citizens are equally entitled to share - Moreover, SC in Yeshwant Singh Kothari vs. State Bank of Indore & Ors 1993 INDLAW SC 332 and K. Nagaraj and Others Etc vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another etc 1985 INDLAW SC 444, held that while testing the validity of policy issues like the age of retirement, it is not proper to put the conflicting claims in a sensitive judicial scale and decide the issue by finding out which way the balance tilts - Such an exercise is within the domain of the Legislature - By the impugned provision, the Legislature, after balancing the competing interest of different groups, has sought to open avenues of employment for a large number of educated youth in the State - From the material placed on record it cannot be said that impugned provision has been enacted without any data and consideration of broad aspects of the question - Hence, provision which prescribes retiring the persons from public employment in the State of Nagaland on completion of 35 years' service from the date of joining or until attaining the age of 60 years, whichever is earlier, does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness or irrationality and is not violative of arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution - Appeal has no merit, hence dismissed.
Om Prakash Saini vs DCM Limited and others  [SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 06 Jul 2010]
Consumer Protection - Constitution - Banking & Finance - Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - Constitution of India, 1950, art. 227 - Company Act, 1956, ss. 391 r/w. ss. 392 and 394 - Payment of matured amount - Appellant invested Rs.1,90,000 in the Fully Secured Debentures floated by respondent No.1 which were due for payment on 14-08-1998 - Just before that date, respondent No.1 informed the appellant that due to financial difficulties it will not be possible to pay the maturity amount on the scheduled dates and a revised scheme has been worked out for payment of the dues - However, as respondent No.1 did not pay the amount as per the revised scheme, the appellant filed a complaint under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 before the State Commission - State Commission allowed the complaint and directed the respondent to pay the maturity amount to the appellant as per the terms of contract along with interest - Respondent no. 1 filed petition u/art. 227 of Constitution of India which was allowed by Single Judge on the ground that in the face of the scheme sanctioned by the Company Judge under the Companies Act, the State Commission did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint - Appellant filed appeal against said order contending that HC committed a jurisdictional error by entertaining the petition filed by respondent No.1 u/art. 227 of the Constitution ignoring that respondent No.1 had already availed the statutory remedy of appeal - Whether appellant's submissions could be accepted? - Held, yes - Admittedly, respondent No.1 had availed the alternative remedy available to it by filing an appeal against the order of the State Commission - During the pendency of the appeal filed by respondent No.1 u/s. 21 of the 1986 Act, the Single Judge was not justified in entertaining the petition filed u/art. 227 of the Constitution merely because he thought that the State Commission did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint in view of the scheme sanctioned by the Company Judge u/s. 391 r/w. ss. 392 and 394 of the Companies Act - Dismissal of the application filed by the appellant for recall of order is clearly vitiated by a patent error of law - Moreover, in the petition filed by him, appellant had averred that he could not file reply because of heart ailment and on the date of hearing he could not reach the High Court because of failure of the public bus transport system - Respondent No.1 did not controvert these averments - Notwithstanding this, the Single Judge dismissed the application without even examining sufficiency of the cause shown by the appellant for his non-appearance on the date of hearing - Impugned order set aside and matter remitted to HC for fresh adjudication - Appeals allowed.
Vijaya Bank vs Shyamal Kumar Lodh  [SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 06 Jul 2010]
(A) Constitution - Labour & Industrial Law - Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, ss. 7 and 33C - Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1964 (Act 36 of 1964), s. 23 - Jurisdiction - Suspension/subsistence allowance - Respondent-employee of the appellant-nationalised bank filed application before Labour Court u/s.7 of ID Act for an award computing his suspension/subsistence allowance u/s. 33C(2) of ID Act - Labour court issued notice to the appellant - Appellant questioned Labour Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute on the ground that the said Court having not been specified by the Central Government u/s. 33C(2) of ID Act, it had no jurisdiction to entertain the application - Labour Court over-ruled that objection and held that its jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute is not ousted - Appellant preferred writ petition against said order - Single Judge allowed the writ petition and quashed the aforesaid order - DB allowed appeal filed against said order and held that as the Labour Court at Dibrugarh has not been specified by the Central Government, it had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition preferred by the respondent - However, on its finding that claim of subsistence allowance falls within s. 10A(2) of the suspension/subsistence allowance, and the Branch of the Bank where the respondent was working, fell within the limits of jurisdiction of Labour Court in question, it shall have jurisdiction to decide the claim - Hence, present appeal - Whether Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain application filed by the respondent when said Court having not been specified by the Central Government u/s. 33C(2) of ID Act? - Held, as per explanation appended to s. 33C(2) of ID Act, Labour Court shall include any Court constituted under any law relating to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in any State - Money due to an employee under s. 33C(2) is to be decided by Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government - Therefore, the expression 'Labour Court' in s. 33C(2) has to be given an extended meaning so as to include Court constituted under any law relating to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in any State - It widens the choice of appropriate Government and it can specify not only the Labour Courts constituted u/s. 7 of ID but such other Courts constituted under any other law relating to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in any State - Hence, Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain application filed by the respondent - Appeal dismissed.

(B) Constitution - Labour & Industrial Law - Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, ss. 7 and 33C -Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1964 (Act 36 of 1964), s. 23 - Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, s. 10-A - Jurisdiction - Suspension/subsistence allowance - Whether Labour Court at Dibrugarh could have entertained the application u/s. 10-A of Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946? - Held, from a plain reading of s. 10A(2) of Act it is evident that the Labour Court constituted under the ID Act, 1947 within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the establishment is situated, has jurisdiction to decide any dispute regarding subsistence allowance - In the present case undisputedly dispute pertains to subsistence allowance and the Labour Court where the workman had brought the action has been constituted u/s. 7 of the ID Act, 1947 and further the appellant bank is situated within the local limits of its jurisdiction - Workman had, though, chosen to file application u/s. 33C(2) of the ID Act but that it shall not denude jurisdiction to the Labour Court, if it otherwise possesses jurisdiction - Incorrect label of the application and mentioning wrong provision neither confers jurisdiction nor denudes the Court of its jurisdiction - Labour Court, Dibrugarh satisfies all the requirements to decide the dispute raised by the respondent before it - Appeal dismissed.


(1) Public Service Commission, Uttaranchal; (2) State of Uttaranchal vs Mamta Bisht and others  [SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 03 Jun 2010]
Constitution - Advocates & Judges - Service - Constitution of India, 1950, arts. 15(3) and 16(4) - Judicial Services - Special Reservation and Social Reservation - Public Service Commission, Uttaranchal (Commission) issued an advertisement inviting applications for 35 posts of Civil Judge, (Junior Division) with a stipulation that the number of vacancies may be increased or decreased - Respondent No.1 applied in pursuance of the said advertisement seeking benefit of reservation in favour of Uttaranchal women - Before completion of the selection process, a decision had been taken to fill up 42 instead of 35 vacancies and reservation policy had been implemented accordingly - Respondent No.1 was not selected - Respondent No.1, being aggrieved filed Writ Petition seeking for quashing of select list mainly on the ground that women candidates belonging to Uttaranchal had secured marks making them eligible to be selected in general category and had it been done so, respondent No.1 could have been selected in reserved category being a woman of Uttaranchal - HC accepted submission of respondent No. 1 - Hence, present appeals - (A) Impleadment of necessary party - Held, in case the respondent No.1 wanted her selection against the reserved category vacancy, the last selected candidate in that category was a necessary party and without impleading her, the writ petition could not have been entertained by the HC in view of the law laid down by SC in Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia vs. Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar & Anr., 1962 INDLAW SC 479, wherein the Court has explained the distinction between necessary party, proper party and proforma party and further held that if a person who is likely to suffer from the order of the Court and has not been impleaded as a party has a right to ignore the said order as it has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice - (B) Whether order passed by HC justified? - HC allowed the writ petition only on the ground that the horizontal reservation is also to be applied as vertical reservation in favour of reserved category candidates (social) - Held, view taken by the HC on application of horizontal reservation is contrary to the law laid down by SC in Rajesh Kumar Daria Vs. Rajasthan Public Service Commission & Ors. 2007 INDLAW SC 1519, wherein dealing with a similar issue SC held that social reservations in favour of SC, ST and OBC u/art. 16(4) are "vertical reservations" and special reservations in favour of physically handicapped, women, etc., u/arts. 16(1) or 15(3) are "horizontal reservations" - Where a vertical reservation is made in favour of a Backward Class u/art. 16(4), the candidates belonging to such Backward Class, may compete for non-reserved posts and if they are appointed to the non-reserved posts on their own merit, their number will not be counted against the quota reserved for respective Backward Class - But the aforesaid principle applicable to vertical (social) reservations will not apply to horizontal (special) reservations - Judgment and order impugned set aside - Appeals allowed.


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